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Abstract
The private provision mechanism is individually incentive compatible
but ine¢cient. The Lindahl mechanism is e¢cient but not incentive com-
patible. We analyze the outcome of the manipulated Lindahl mechanism.
When the demand announcements of participants are unrestricted the
Lindahl mechanism su¤ers from multiple equilibria. If the government
removes the multiplicity by restricting the functional form of announce-
ments the resulting Lindahl equilibrium can be made approximately ef-
…cient. Approximate e¢ciency is achieved by announcements that are
one-dimensional regardless of the number of participants in the mech-
anism. This is in contrast to mechanisms that achieve exact e¢ciency
but require announcements whose dimensionality increases at the same
rate as the number of participants. The mechanism we describe bene…ts
from simplicity at the cost of approximate e¢ciency. We demonstrate
that mechanisms in which a linear demand function is announced are su-
permodular so play will converge to the Nash equilibrium for a range of
learning dynamics.
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11 Introduction
The Lindahl mechanism was introduced to economics by Lindahl (1919) and
…rst formalized by Johansen (1963). The basis of the mechanism is that each
participant announces a demand function for a public good with the cost share
as the argument of the function. An equilibrium of the mechanism is a set of
cost shares and a level of public good that simultaneously satisfy the demand
functions and the need for the cost shares to sum to one. If all participants act
honestly, so announce demand functions that re‡ect preferences, the equilibrium
is e¢cient: it selects a point from the “Samuelson set” of e¢cient allocations
for the public good economy. Unfortunately, the Lindahl mechanism is not in-
centive compatible. By announcing a false demand function a participant in
the mechanism can gain by increasing the share of the public good …nanced by
other participants, even though this will reduce the quantity of public good in
equilibrium. The private provision of a public good can be seen as an alterna-
tive allocation mechanism. In this mechanism the strategy of each participant
is a level of contribution to the public good. The private provision mecha-
nism is incentive compatible and, under standard assumptions, has a unique
equilibrium (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986, 1992). However, the private
provision equilibrium is not e¢cient and a simultaneous increase in provision
by all participants is Pareto-improving.
These properties of the Lindahl and private provision mechanisms are all
well-known and several surveys are available (Cornes and Sandler 1996, Myles
1995). What we wish to consider is the operation of the Lindahl mechanism
when the operator knows neither the preferences nor the endowments of partic-
ipants in the mechanism, and the participants act strategically. We …rst assume
that all participants attempt to manipulate the mechanism with freedom to
choose from a general set of announcements. Our intention is to establish the
existence of an equilibrium for this situation and to derive its properties, fo-
cussing in particular upon how it compares to the private provision equilibrium.
We then consider the role that intervention by the operator can play in limit-
ing manipulation when the operator is uninformed. The form of intervention
on which we focus is restriction of the functional form of permissible demand
announcement.
Our motivation for pursuing this inquiry is that the Lindahl mechanism is
an eminently practical method of determining public good provision. Since it
relies only on the announcement of a demand function by each participant it
is a simple and implementable way of eliciting valuations and determining an
equilibrium allocation. Its usefulness is ampli…ed by that fact that it does not
require the operator to have any information on preferences or endowments. At
the heart of our analysis is the question of whether we can retain any of these
appealing properties and at the same time reduce the manipulation of the mech-
anism. Looking ahead, our main results show that by placing restrictions upon
the demand functions that can be announced we can construct simple mecha-
nisms that achieve an equilibrium allocation that is approximately e¢cient. It
should be noted at this point that the Lindahl mechanism (with honest reve-
2lation) decentralizes a single point in the Samuelson set of e¢cient allocations.
This feature of the Lindahl mechanism is often overlooked in the literature. The
mechanism we construct also approximately decentralizes a single point but this
need not be the same point as for the Lindahl mechanism with honest revelation:
both points are Pareto e¢cient but may di¤er in the cost share of the public
good assigned to each participant. Although the equilibria are in the Samuelson
set there may be nothing especially attractive about the distributional aspects of
either allocation. What we do show in this respect is that, under certain condi-
tions, the approximately-e¢cient point Pareto-dominates the private provision
equilibrium.
The paper contributes to the extensive literature on mechanisms for the
decentralization of e¢cient equilibria with public goods. Bergstrom (1970) de-
scribed the distributive Lindahl mechanism in which each participant announces
a set of cost shares (for each good, for each participant) and prices are adjusted
to achieve an equilibrium which is necessarily e¢cient. Recently this mechanism
has been generalized by Tian (2003) to ensure that it is safe from the formation
of coalitions. Varian (1994) proposed a compensation mechanism that decentral-
izes e¢cient equilibria. This mechanism involves each participant announcing
a vector of Pigouvian taxes (equal in dimensionality to the number of partic-
ipants). Each participant is then subjected to the taxes announced by other
participants plus a side-payment based on the deviation of his Pigouvian taxes
from those of the other players. Anderlini and Siconol… (2004) also constructed
a mechanism that decentralizes the set of e¢cient equilibria. In their mechanism
the government announces a set of tax shares, then each consumer announces
the contribution they wish to make to the public good as an addition to that
already announced by other consumers plus a set of (non-negative) transfers of
endowment they wish to make. This achieves an e¢cient outcome provided that
there are at least three consumers (the same requirement appears in the analysis
by Cornes and Sandler (2000) of Pareto-improvements in the private contribu-
tion model). However, the mechanism does not determine the tax shares nor
generate the information necessary to derive these shares from welfare maxi-
mization. It should be noted that the strategy announced by participants in
each of these mechanisms has dimensionality at least equal to the number of
participants, and sometimes equal to the square of this number. As a conse-
quence, the strategies become increasingly complex (as measured by dimension-
ality) as the number of participants increases. The complexity of messages is
avoided in the mechanism described in Groves and Ledyard (1977, 1980). This
is achieved by changing the message space from the communication of prices (or
taxes) to the communication of quantities. Their “optimal government” utilizes
a quadratic rule for computing the charge levied on each consumer given the
messages received (increments to the level of public good), and decentralizes an
e¢cient allocation. Further developments of this class of mechanisms are sur-
veyed in Groves and Ledyard (1987). Walker (1981) proposed a mechanism in
which each participant announces a quantity and pays a price dependent on the
quantity announcements of other participants. This mechanism has the feature
of being one-dimensional but, as observed by Tian (1990, 1991), may not be
3individually feasible. Tian demonstrated how the mechanism could be modi…ed
to be individually feasible but at the cost of increased complexity.
Where we depart from this literature is that we remain with the central Lin-
dahlian concept of consumers announcing public good demand functions which,
in turn, determine tax shares and the level of public good. It is known that
the equilibrium of the Lindahl mechanism is not incentive-compatible so an-
nounced demands will not be true demands. What has not been clari…ed by
the existing literature is the equilibrium that emerges when all participants in
the Lindahl mechanism attempt to manipulate it by announcing false demands,
or even whether an equilibrium exists in such a case. The closest work is by
Otani and Sicilian (1982), who study the equilibrium of demand announcements
in private good economies, and by Sertel and Sanver (1999), who study public
good economies. Sertel and Sanver construct a set of conditions under which
false announcement by all participants in the Lindahl mechanism leads to the
private provision equilibrium. However, it is assumed that the government, who
is the operator of the mechanism, knows the preferences of the participants and
is uninformed only about endowments. Our analysis assumes that the opera-
tor knows neither preferences nor endowments. We prove that an equilibrium
does exist, and use this fact as a starting point for analyzing how the Lindahl
mechanism can be improved if the manipulation is taken into account. We show
that by restricting the permissible functional form of the demand announcement
it is possible to construct a mechanism in which each participant announces a
single parameter and the resulting equilibrium is approximately e¢cient. We
do not use approximately e¢cient here to mean that it approaches e¢ciency as
population size becomes large, but instead to refer to the limit as a parameter
in the announced demand tends to a speci…c value. The important feature of
the mechanism is that each participant makes a one-dimensional announcement
regardless of the size of the population. The practical value of the mechanism
is that the announcement is no more that the statement of a demand for the
public good as a function of the tax share. Hence, our mechanism can elicit the
necessary information with a single question that can be easily implemented.
Compared to other mechanisms in the literature we obtain simplicity at the cost
of approximate e¢ciency.
These results naturally lead in to questions about how the knowledge about
the optimal strategies for the games can arise. To address this issue we appeal
to the recent literature linking learning in games to supermodularity. We show
that the mechanisms with linear announcements are supermodular games for
a non-empty set of values of the parameters of the mechanisms. Chen (2002,
2005) applies the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to show that several ex-
isting public goods mechanisms in the literature are supermodular games, which
implies that the participants can learn to play the equilibrium strategies under
a variety of learning mechanisms. In addition, Chen proposes a new family of
public goods mechanisms that are supermodular games with quasi-linear utility.
We also show that an alternative version of the mechanism, one with announce-
ment that are hyperbolic functions of cost shares, is not a supermodular game
for the admissible set of parameters of this mechanism. This potentially gives
4an advantage, in terms of learning the equilibrium strategy, to the mechanisms
with linear announcements.
The second section of the paper introduces the notation and brie‡y describes
the private provision model and the Lindahl mechanism. Section 3 presents
the general results on the existence and multiplicity of equilibria with general
demand announcements in the Lindahl mechanism. The consequences of using
parametric representations of possible announcements are considered in Section
4. Sections 5 and 6 demonstrates how approximate e¢ciency can be achieved
for mechanisms with linear and hyperbolic announcements, respectively. The
issue of learning is addressed in Section 7. Conclusions are given in Section 8.
2 Equilibrium provision
The economy we analyze has a single private good and a single public good.
Production of both goods is subject to constant returns to scale. The units of
measurement are chosen so that the price of both goods is constant at 1. We
call the agents that are involved in the allocation mechanisms participants. This
neutral terminology is chosen to capture the fact that the participants can be
consumers, …rms, or countries. There are H participants indexed h = 1;:::;H.
The income of participant h is …xed at Mh > 0. Participant h has preferences
represented by the utility function
Uh = Uh (xh;G); (1)
where xh is consumption of the private good and G the total quantity of public
good. In their analysis of private provision Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986) place restrictions upon the choices arising from (??). Conditions (i) and
(ii) of Assumption 1 can be shown to be su¢cient to imply the restrictions
of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian. These assumptions do not ensure that a
positive quantity of the public good will be provided in equilibrium or that every
participant will consume some of the private good. To rule out the uninteresting
case of no demand for the public good we impose condition (iii). We impose
condition (iv) to simplify some of the proofs by ensuring that every participant
demands a positive quantity of the private good in equilibrium.
Assumption 1 The utility function is twice continuously di¤erentiable and sat-
is…es:




h;") > Uh (x00
h;0) for any " > 0 and 0 < x0
h < x00
h;
(iv) Uh (";G0) > Uh (0;G00) for any " > 0 and 0 < G0 < G00:
2.1 Private provision mechanism
In the private provision mechanism participant h makes a contribution gh ￿ 0
to the public good, and G =
PH
h=1 gh. If gh > 0 participant h is termed a
5contributor and is a non-contributor if gh = 0. The contribution towards the
public good by all participants other than h, Gh, is de…ned by Gh = G ￿ gh:
Using the budget constraint xh + gh = Mh, utility can be written in terms of
Gh and gh as
Uh (xh;G) = Uh ￿
Mh ￿ gh;gh + Gh
￿
: (2)
Participant h chooses gh to maximize (2) given Gh and subject to gh 2 [0;Mh].









The equilibrium of the private provision mechanism occurs at a set of choices
for the participants that satis…es all the reaction functions simultaneously.
De…nition 1 A private provision equilibrium is an array of contributions fb ghg,




for all h = 1;:::;H, with Gh =
PH
j=1;j6=h b gj.
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986, 1992) prove that a private provision
equilibrium exists under Assumption 1. Furthermore, they demonstrate that a
su¢cient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium is that both private and public
goods are normal. This condition is implied by Assumption 1. Our additional
assumption ensures that the equilibrium level of public good is positive. The
private provision mechanism is also an aggregative game (Cornes and Hartley,
2004),meaning that the equilibrium is dependent on the sum of contributors’
incomes and is invariant to income redistributions that do not change the set of
contributors.
2.2 Lindahl mechanism
The Lindahl mechanism requires that each participant announce a demand func-
tion for the public good. Denote by ￿h; 0 ￿ ￿h ￿ 1; the share of cost of the
public good paid by h: If a quantity G of the public good is provided the budget
constraint of h is
xh + ￿hG = Mh: (3)
The Lindahl demand function of h is denoted 'h (￿h); where 'h : [0;1] ! <+.
A Lindahl equilibrium given a set of announced demand functions can now be
de…ned. Notice that feasibility is de…ned with respect to the equilibrium shares
and public good level: the announced demand does not need to be individually
feasible outside of equilibrium. The Lindahl equilibrium can be shown to exist
under weak assumptions upon the Lindahl demand functions. We give such a
proof in the next section.
De…nition 2 A Lindahl equilibrium given a set of announced demand func-
tions f'1 (￿1);:::;'H (￿H)gis an array of shares and a level of public good, n
b ￿1;:::;b ￿H; ^ G
o
, such that for all h
￿
^ G ￿ 'h (^ ￿h);
^ ￿h ￿ 0;
6with complementary slackness,




^ ￿h = 1:
The announced Lindahl demand function is the true Lindahl demand func-
tion (participant h act honestly) if for all ￿h 2 [0;1]
'h (￿h) = argmax
fGg
Uh (Mh ￿ ￿hG;G): (4)
Assumption 1iv guarantees that the true Lindahl demand function satis…es
￿h'h (￿h) < Mh; (5)
for all ￿h 2 [0;1]. When all participants announce true Lindahl demand func-
tions the equilibrium of the mechanism is e¢cient. Ignoring corner solutions for
simplicity a demonstration follows by observing that the necessary condition for




















￿h = 1: (7)
This is the Samuelson rule for the economy and completes the demonstration
that the Lindahl equilibrium with honest announcement is Pareto e¢cient.
The e¢ciency of the Lindahl mechanism with honest announcements is
shown in Figure 1. The true Lindahl demand functions are the loci of the points
at which the indi¤erence curves are vertical, and the equilibrium is found at their
intersection. At this point the indi¤erence curves for the two participants are
tangential and the equilibrium is Pareto e¢cient. Note for later reference that
the Samuelson set is given by the dashed locus of tangency points.
It is well known that the Lindahl mechanism is not incentive compatible.
By announcing a demand function that di¤ers from the true demand function
a participant in the mechanism can bene…cially modify the outcome. This is
shown in Figure 2 where it is assumed that participant 1 acts honestly and
participant 2 knows the demand announcement of 1. Honesty on the part of
participant 2 would lead to the equilibrium eL. However, by announcing a false
demand function the equilibrium can be driven to point eM which represents
the maximization of 2’s utility given the Lindahl demand function of 1.
7→ 1 τ
2 1 ˆ , ˆ τ τ 2 τ ←
G G
( ) 1 1 τ ϕ
( ) 2 2 τ ϕ
Samuelson
set
Figure 1: Lindahl equilibrium with true demands
→ 1 τ 2 τ ←
G G
( ) 1 1 τ ϕ
( ) 2 2 τ ϕ
L e
M e
Figure 2: Incentive incompatibility
83 Announcement equilibrium
The observation that the Lindahl mechanism is not incentive compatible raises
questions about the equilibrium that emerges if all participants strategically
choose false announcements. The example of the previous section has shown
that if one participant is acting strategicically the equilibrium level of public
good is reduced relative to the level with honest announcement. It might be
thought that strategic behavior by all participants drives the level of public good
even lower. Surprisingly, this issue does not seem to have received attention in
the existing literature.
We now address the existence of an equilibrium with strategic announce-
ments. Throughout the analysis we maintain the following assumption on the
announced demand functions.
Assumption 2 For all h = 1;:::;H;a Lindahl demand function 'h (￿h) : [0;1] !
<+ satis…es:
(i) 'h (￿h) is continuous;
(ii) 'h (￿h) is strictly monotonically decreasing whenever 'h (￿h) > 0.
Relaxing restriction (ii) to allow weakly decreasing demand would not be
too di¢cult but would require some of the results to be modi…ed. We denote
the set of demand functions satisfying Assumption 2 by ￿, and the array of
announcements by ' = ('1 (￿1);:::;'H (￿H)) 2 ￿H ￿ ￿H￿:
We have introduced the concept of a Lindahl share for each participant. The
requirement that these shares are consistent with the allocation of the full cost
of the public good between participants is captured in De…nition 3.
De…nition 3 A vector ￿ = (￿1;:::￿H) of Lindahl shares satis…es:
(i) ￿h ￿ 0 all h
(ii)
P
h ￿h = 1:
Given demand announcements ' the resulting Lindahl shares are a solution
(if one exists) to the system
￿
'h (￿h) ￿ maxf'1 (￿1);:::;'H (￿H)g; all h;
￿h ￿ 0; (8)
where the inequalities hold with complementary slackness. At a solution to (8)
the Lindahl shares are determined by ￿ 2 ￿('); ￿(') : ￿H ! ￿, where ￿
denotes the set of subsets of the SH￿1 simplex, and the level of public good is
determined as G = 'k (￿k) for some k with ￿k > 0; we write G = ￿('); where
￿(') : ￿H ! <+:
The …rst result proves the existence of a vector of Lindahl shares for any set
of announcements.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2:
(i) There exists a vector, ￿ ￿, of Lindahl shares satisfying (8);
(ii) If 'h (￿ ￿h) > 0 for any h, then ￿ ￿ is the unique vector of shares satisfying
(8).





announcement equilibrium is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 4 An announcement equilibrium is an array of announcements ^ ' 2
￿H; a vector of Lindahl shares ^ ￿; and a level of public good, ^ G, such that
(i) Given ^ ' the shares ^ ￿ and the level of public good ^ G satisfy ^ ￿ 2 ￿(^ ') and
^ G = ￿(^ ');
(ii) The announcements ^ ' satisfy


















(iii) The shares ^ ￿ and the level of public good ^ G are feasible
^ ￿h ^ G ￿ Mh for all h:
Observe that although ￿(') may be set-valued for some ' this only occurs
when ￿(') = 0, in which case the value of Uh is the same for all ￿ in the image
of ':
With these de…nitions it is now possible to prove the existence of an an-
nouncement equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there exists an announcement equi-
librium.
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that an array of equilibrium announcements
exists which support the private provision equilibrium as an announcement equi-
librium. The properties of the private provision equilibrium are only used in
the proof to simplify the system of equations that has to be solved to construct
the announcement equilibrium. The continuity of the announcements shows
that the system of equations must also have a strictly positive solution in some
neighborhood of the private provision equilibrium. Therefore, there must be
other allocations which can be supported as announcement equilibria. When
there are only two consumers this fact is easily demonstrated. Consider Figure
3. Select a point such as a1 where two indi¤erence curves cross with positive
gradient. Then add a linear announcement for participant 1 which is tangential
to the indi¤erence curve of participant 2, and a linear announcement for partic-
ipant 2 which is tangential to the indi¤erence curve of participant 1. The same
construction can also be applied to derive announcements that support a2 as
an equilibrium. These announcements constitute an equilibrium since neither
participant has an incentive to deviate. These observations lead to the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 The Lindahl mechanism has multiple announcement equilibria.
This non-uniqueness of announcements when participants are strategic was
observed in a related context by Varian (1994). In fact, it is possible to sup-
port any allocation where the indi¤erence curves have positive gradient, which




Figure 3: Multiple equilibria
for some forms of preferences will be the entire set of allocations below the
Samuelson locus in the Lindahl allocation space. Once we allow the partici-
pants freedom to make strategic announcements the model is unable to provide
a prediction upon the equilibrium allocation.
4 Parametric announcements
The proof of existence for an announcement equilibrium involved the support
of a chosen allocation by linear announcements. The next result demonstrates
that the use of linear announcements presents a general route to a simpli…ed
analysis of the equilibrium, since any equilibrium in announcements that satisfy
Assumptions 2 can be achieved by the announcement of linear demand functions.
Lemma 2 If ^ ' is an array of equilibrium announcements for the Lindahl mech-
anism, then ^  ; ^  h (￿h) ￿ max
n
^ ah ￿^ bh￿h;0
o
; is also an array of equilibrium
announcements if (i) ^  h (^ ￿h) = ^ 'h (^ ￿h) and (ii) ^ bh = ^ '
0
h (^ ￿h) for all h with
^ 'h (^ ￿h) > 0:
The implication of this result is that the search for equilibrium in terms of
announcements satisfying Assumption 2 can be replaced by a search among the
subset of linear announcements without altering the set of equilibria. All that
is important is the point of intersection of the announcements, and the gradient
of the announcements at the point of intersection.
However, there still remains the problem of multiplicity. We need to be
careful to check that the replacement of general announcements by linear an-
nouncements has not reduced the set of allocations that can be supported. For
11instance, if the optimization of utility over the choice of linear announcements
resulted in a unique choice for each participant then the multiplicity of equilibria
would have been removed and linear announcement would be more restrictive
then general announcements. This will not occur if the optimization over linear
announcements does not uniquely determine the two parameters of the linear
announcement for each participant. We now illustrate the answer to this ques-
tion by way of an example.
To see what can be identi…ed assume that the announcement of participant h
is a function de…ned by a vector of n parameters (for instance a non-degenerate
polynomial of degree n). Denote this function by f (￿h;ch1;:::;chn) so that
participant h announces ch = (ch1;:::;chn). We assume the announcement is
di¤erentiable and that there is no redundancy so fchk 6= 0. For any array of
announcements from the participants the shares, ￿; and the level of public good,
G, solve ￿
f (￿h;ch) = G; PH
h=1 ￿h = 1:
(9)
For the purpose of this example we assume that there is a unique interior solution
to (9) which can be expressed (adapting our previous notation) by
￿h = ￿h (c1;:::;cH);: h = 1;:::;H;
G = ￿(c1;:::;cH):
We also assume that the functions ￿h (c1;:::;cH) and ￿(c1;:::;cH) are di¤eren-
tiable.





Mh ￿ ￿h (c1;:::;cH)￿(c1;:::;cH);￿(c1;:::;cH)
￿
: (10)
Observe that ￿cik = f￿i￿i










































This condition does not depend on k so there is a single independent necessary
condition and the optimization can determine at most one parameter of the
announcement for all k = 1;:::;n.
The conclusion of this section is that the general announcements can be
replaced by linear announcements. However, the problem of non-uniqueness still
arises. The necessary conditions for the choice of parametrized announcement do
not uniquely determine the parameters of the linear announcement. In fact, the
12example shows how at most one parameter of any parametrized announcement
can be found. This re‡ects the multiplicity of equilibria but causes problems for
the mechanism without government intervention. One positive aspect is that
the path is opened for the government to modify the mechanism by restricting
one or more parameters of the announcement in order to enhance the e¢ciency
of the equilibrium.
5 Intervention with linear announcements
The analysis of the previous section implies that the announcement mecha-
nism will only have a unique equilibrium if announcements are restricted to be
monoparametric functions. This fact can be exploited by the operator of the
mechanism in the following way. The operator can insist that participants make
announcements with a restricted functional form. If the set of permissible an-
nouncements have one free parameter that is chosen by the participants then a
unique equilibrium can be ensured. What then becomes interesting is the extent
to which the operator can control the equilibrium that results.
In this section we consider the consequence of restricting permissible an-
nouncements to be linear. Two forms of linear announcement are studied.
De…nition 5 (i) In an announcement mechanism with …xed gradient the an-
nouncement of each participant h must be of the form 'h (￿h) = maxfah ￿ b￿h;0g:
(ii) In an announcement mechanism with …xed intercept the announcement
of each participant h must be of the form 'h (￿h) = maxfa ￿ bh￿h;0g:
For the announcement mechanism with …xed gradient the intercept, ah; of
the announcement becomes the single choice variable of participant h. Con-
versely, with the …xed intercept it is the gradient, bh, that is the choice variable.
Note that this de…nition is consistent with Assumption 2. In other words, de-
manding a negative amount of public good is ruled out (negative shares are
ruled out by De…nition 3); however, it is possible that with linear announce-
ments there exists an equilibrium or a continuum of equilibria with G = 0.
The interesting question is how the equilibrium of the mechanism is modi…ed
through the selection of the …xed parameter by the government. To state the
result we need to de…ne the concept of approximate e¢ciency.










for some scalar ￿:
It should be noted that ￿ may be …nite or in…nite, and that the equilibrium
may not be well de…ned at the limiting value. A general result on approximate
e¢ciency with linear announcements is established when the following additional
assumption is imposed upon preferences.
13Theorem 2 Let ￿ = 1. Under Assumption 1
(i) The equilibrium of the announcement mechanism with …xed gradient,
￿ = b, is approximately e¢cient.
(ii) The equilibrium of the announcement mechanism with …xed intercept,
￿ = a, is approximately e¢cient.
Theorem 2 shows that the government can control the announcement equi-
librium by restricting the form of announcement that is permissible. By insisting
the announcements are linear, and by appropriately setting either the gradient
or the intercept of the announcement, it is possible to achieve approximate e¢-
ciency. The mechanism requires each participant to announce a single parameter
regardless of the number of participants. Furthermore, the mechanism achieves
approximate e¢ciency without the government requiring any information on
incomes or preferences.
Linear announcements are not the only functional form that can achieve
approximate e¢ciency, and the next section introduces an alternative form that
has some appealing features.
6 Hyperbolic announcements
This section shows that the restriction to hyperbolic demand functions can
also be used to obtain approximate e¢ciency. These announcements retain the
feature of the linear case that the message is one-dimensional regardless of the
number of participants in the mechanism.
6.1 Approximate e¢ciency
The choice of an announcement can be expressed in a di¤erent form to moti-
vate the construction. Assume there are two participants in the mechanism.
Given the announcement of participant i, participant j chooses the point on i’s




Uj (Mj ￿ ￿j'i (1 ￿ ￿j);'i (1 ￿ ￿j)): (11)








'i (1 ￿ ￿j)
'
0
i (1 ￿ ￿j)
: (12)
The simultaneous solution to (12) and the analogous …rst-order condition for






x ; h = 1;2, the …rst-order conditions are di¤erential equations that
solve for announcements which lead to the chosen values in equilibrium. Pro-
ceeding in this way permits the outcome to be engineered.
The basis of the approximate e¢ciency result is built on the next theorem
which relates the announcement equilibrium and the private provision equilib-
rium.
14Lemma 3 The announcement equilibrium coincides with the private provision
equilibrium if the only permissible announcements are of the hyperbolic form
'h (￿h) = Ch
￿h .
Lemma 3 implies that if the participants are required to announce the con-
stant Ch in a hyperbolic demand function then the private provision equilibrium
is achieved. The attainment of the private provision equilibrium through an-
nouncement of hyperbolic demands is interesting, but does not provide a case
in favor of using such announcements to allocate the public good. Instead, it
suggests that private provision can be employed as a simpler mechanism that
requires no government intervention. However, a modi…cation of hyperbolic
announcement can improve upon the private provision equilibrium.
De…ne an announcement mechanism with modi…ed hyperbolic demand as
follows.
De…nition 7 An announcement mechanism with modi…ed hyperbolic demand
requires each participant to announce the parameter Ch in a demand function
of the form 'h (￿h) =
Ch
￿h ￿ ￿
, ￿ 2 (￿;1], for given ￿ 2 [0;1].
We can then …nd circumstances in which the modi…ed hyperbolic demand
can be used to generate a Pareto improvement over the private provision equi-
librium.





an increase in ￿ generates a Pareto improvement.
The reasoning behind this lemma is based on the fact that the private pro-
vision mechanism is an aggregative game. Hence, the equilibrium outcome is
determined by the sum of incomes. When participants have identical preferences
the attainment of a Pareto improvement starting from ￿ = 0 does not depend
upon the distribution of income. Furthermore, this argument can be applied at
every value of ￿ until a point in the Samuelson set is achieved.
A Pareto improvement may not occur with an increase in ￿ if the participants
do not have identical preferences. The reason for this is that an increase in ￿
moves the economy closer to the e¢cient allocation with equal shares. If the
shares are very dissimilar at the private provision equilibrium then moving to
equal shares may cause a loss for participants whose initial shares were low.
However, as Lemma 5 shows, this cannot happen for all participants.





there is at least




Using the necessary condition for choice of Ci from the proof of Lemma 4
15the su¢cient condition for
@Uh
@￿






















where ￿h and ￿h are related to the preferences of agent h (see Appendix). This
condition can be interpreted as stating that participants whose preferences are
not very di¤erent from “the average” are likely to bene…t from an increase in ￿.
The increase in ￿ may not always generate a Pareto improvement since the
implied redistribution can o¤set the e¢ciency gain. What can be shown is that
it is always possible to obtain approximate e¢ciency by appropriate choice of
￿. The central theorem is the following.
Theorem 3 Let ￿ = 1
H. The equilibrium of the announcement mechanism with
modi…ed hyperbolic demands, ￿ = ￿, is approximately e¢cient.
The limit equilibrium is e¢cient and has equal shares. Note, however, that
this result is not the same as simply telling participants that there are equal
shares and asking for an announcement of public good demand. If the govern-
ment were to do this, there would be free-riding and ine¢ciency would result.
Two points are worth noting. First, the limit as ￿ !
1
H
is e¢cient but will
not coincide with the Lindahl equilibrium with honest announcement unless
that has ^ ￿ = 1
H. This is illustrated for H = 2 in …gure 4. The locus of e¢cient
allocations is shown in the tax share diagram. These all occur at tangencies
of the indi¤erence curves. The Lindahl equilibrium is identi…ed as the e¢cient
allocation where the indi¤erence curves are vertical. The announcement equi-
librium with modi…ed hyperbolic announcements tends to the point with shares






if ￿ = 1
H
and H ! 1; thus giving the private provision equilibrium for large economies.
This is not the case since Ch and ￿h are dependent on ￿ through the equilibrium
of the mechanism.
6.2 Coalition proofness
The analysis so far has looked at the strategic incentives of individual partici-
pants. It is also possible for coalitions to deviate. The mechanism must be tested
to see whether it is safe from manipulation by coalitions. The importance of
coalition proofness has been stressed by Bernheim et al. (1987). However, their
recursive concept of coalition-proofness is not straightforward to apply. Instead
we investigate whether the announcement equilibrium meets the strong Nash
equilibrium criterion of Aumann (1959). An equilibrium is strong Nash if no
coalition can pro…tably deviate taking as given the choices of the participants
who are not in the coalition.
16→ 1 τ 2 ˆ τ ←
G G Lindahl
equilibrium
2 / 1 ˆ









Figure 4: Announcement equilibrium
Suppose that the …rst m < H participants form a coalition. Assume that
the coalition’s welfare function is the weighted sum of utilities of its members












Uj (xj;G); j = m + 1;:::;H: (15)
The set of …rst-order conditions for non-members remains the same. For the
members i = 1;:::;m of the coalition the necessary conditions can be written
as
￿Ui














G = 0: (16)
If the coalition members have identical preferences and the weights in the coali-





G and the set of the
…rst-order conditions becomes
￿Ui
x [1 ￿ (H ￿ 1)￿] + (1 ￿ H￿)(m ￿ 1)Ui
x + Ui
G = 0: (17)
In the limit, as ￿ !
1
H
, the second term disappears, and the solution converges
to the non-cooperative outcome. Hence, possible gains from forming a coalition
converge to zero and the mechanism has a strong Nash equilibrium.
177 Learning and convergence
Chen (2002) argues that a mechanism that implements the Lindahl allocation
as a Nash equilibrium is preferable if it is a supermodular game, since the class
of supermodular games converges to a Nash equilibrium under a wide class of
learning dynamics. We show in this section that the mechanisms with linear
demand announcements are supermodular games when certain conditions on
the parameter of the mechanism are satis…ed, whereas the mechanism with
hyperbolic demand announcements is not a supermodular game for any value
of the parameter of this mechanisms.
To establish supermodularity we need to check that the increasing di¤erences
condition holds, since with one-dimensional strategies complementarity among
player’s own strategies holds trivially. We use the following theorem (Topkis
1978, as cited in Chen (2002)).
Theorem Let Uh be twice continuously di¤erentiable on Sh. Then Uh has
increasing di¤erences in (sh;sj) if and only if
@2Uh
@shk@sjl
￿ 0 for all h 6= j
and all h;l.
Because the strategy set in the mechanism proposed in this paper is one-
dimensional we only need to check the sign of
@2Uh
@sh@sj
. Using the fact that G is


























where G0 = @G
@sh = @G
@sj and G00 = @
2G
@sh@sj: In the linear announcement mechanism
with …xed gradient the strategy of consumer h is the intercept, sh = ah =






















(sh ￿ G): (19)
The following proposition establishes the necessary and su¢cient condition on
the parameter b for this mechanism to be a supermodular game.
Proposition 1 Linear announcements mechanism with …xed gradient b is a
supermodular game if and only if for all h 6= j
￿(2G ￿ sh)[sh + (H ￿ 2)G]Uh
xx
￿ bH (2sh + (H ￿ 4)G)Uh
xG + b(H ￿ 2)Uh
x ￿ b2Uh
GG:
18As an illustration, consider a symmetric equilibrium with utility quasilinear
in public good
Uh = lnxh + G = ln(Mh ￿ ￿hG) + G; Mh = M for all h:
In equilibrium ah = a; G = a ￿ b
H; ￿h = 1










which in this case takes the form
bxh = a + (H ￿ 2)G;
























H ￿ 1 + b
H
:
After some manipulation one can show that
@2Uh
@sh@sj
￿ 0 if and only if













+ (H ￿ 1)(H ￿ 2) ￿ 0:
This can hold for b > 0 if an only if
MH
2




￿ H + 1
￿2
> (H ￿ 1)(H ￿ 2);





(H ￿ 1)(H ￿ 2) + H ￿ 1
i
:
Assuming this holds, the mechanism is a supermodular game if and only if its









￿ H + 1
￿2
￿ (H ￿ 1)(H ￿ 2)
3
5:
In the linear announcement mechanism with …xed intercept it is more con-




= argmaxUh (Mh ￿ ￿hG;G): In equilibrium G = a ￿ 1 PH
j=1 sj; and
￿h = sh PH
j=1 sj = sh (a ￿ G): Using the following notation
￿1 = (a ￿ 2G)(G0 + shG00); ￿2 = 2sh (a ￿ 2G)G0 + G(a ￿ G); (20)
￿3 = [sh (a ￿ 2G)G0][sh (a ￿ 2G)G0 + G(a ￿ G)]; (21)








3;the necessary and su¢cient con-
dition on the parameter of the mechanism, a, for this mechanism to be a super-
modular game, can be stated as the following:
Proposition 2 The linear announcements mechanism with …xed intercept a is










It is not di¢cult to see that the mechanism with hyperbolic demand an-
nouncements is not a supermodular game. For this mechanism sh = Ch =
argmax
￿
Uh (Mh ￿ ￿hG;G)
￿
: In equilibrium, the level of public good is G =
PH
h=1 sh
1￿H￿ ; the share of h is ￿h = ￿ + (1 ￿ H￿) sh PH
j=1 sj; and consumption of the




















































1 ￿ ￿ (H ￿ 2)
(1 ￿ H￿)






, by Assumption (1). This proves the following:
Proposition 3 . The mechanism with hyperbolic demand announcements is
not a supermodular game for any admissible values of the parameter ￿ of this
mechanism.
We conclude, that the government can use this as a criterion for choosing
among these mechanisms. The mechanisms with the linear demand announce-
ments for some values of the parameters can be a supermodular game, so aiding
the way the game is learnt. The mechanism with the hyperbolic demand an-
nouncements is not a supermodular game, however, it may still converge to the
Nash equilibrium under certain forms of learning, as it has been investigated in
the literature.
208 Conclusions
The Lindahl mechanism promises much as a means of determining what quantity
of a public good should be supplied and how the cost should be distributed.
This promise is undermined by the strategic behavior of participants in the
mechanism since making a false announcement of preferences is individually
rational. This manipulation can damage the functioning of the mechanism to
such an extent that it may be dominated by the ine¢cient mechanism of private
provision.
We model the manipulation of the mechanism through the announcement of
demand functions for the public good. We have shown that an equilibrium in
announcements exists and that the equilibrium is not unique. In fact, there is
an uncountable in…nity of equilibria. The non-uniqueness is re‡ected in the fact
that in a parametrized version of the announcement the …rst-order conditions
for choice can determine at most one parameter. This leads into the idea of a
mechanism where the permissible structures of the demand announcements are
restricted by the operator of the mechanism. When the demand announcements
must be linear …xing either the slope or the intercept of the announcements al-
lows approximate e¢ciency to be achieved. It was also shown that approximate
e¢ciency could be achieved with modi…ed hyperbolic demand announcement
and the participants could be brought arbitrarily close to the e¢cient equilib-
rium with equal shares.
The value of these results is to show how it is possible to move close to e¢-
ciency with no information on preferences or incomes and, in the limit, to obtain
an equilibrium that is in the Samuelson set. It is also important to stress that the
announcements required to obtain approximate e¢ciency are one-dimensional
regardless of the number of participants. This needs to be contrasted to mech-
anisms that can achieve exact e¢ciency but use messages with dimensionality
at least as great as the number of participants (and sometimes greater). The
limitation of our mechanism is that we can (approximately) decentralize only a
single point in the Samuelson set.
Our analysis has remained true to the spirit of the Lindahl mechanism as
the announcement of public good demand functions with equilibrium deter-
mined by cost shares. What we have shown is that judicious restrictions on
the forms of demand announcements can overcome the consequences of ma-
nipulation. The mechanism trades simplicity for approximate e¢ciency, with
the simplicity suggesting that it is possible to envisage this mechanism being
employable in practice.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1










: V is a
continuous function of the ￿i and has a minimum on the simplex which is a
compact set. Since all terms in the sum are non-negative the minimum value
V can achieve is zero. The proof establishes that V will always achieve the
minimum of 0 on the simplex given Assumption 2.
Assume that for some array of announcements, '; V is minimized by f￿￿g
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i) is greatest (if i is not unique the argument extends









h): Index the members of this set by k = 1;:::; ^ H:
Now de…ne a new set of shares f~ ￿g. Let ~ ￿~ h = ￿￿

















= 'k (~ ￿k);









and ￿'k = 'k (￿￿
k) ￿ 'k (~ ￿k): By (ii)
of Assumption 2 we have ￿'~ h < 0 and ￿'k > 0:
Let ~ V denote the value of V at f~ ￿g. Then observe
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Since V ￿ ￿ ~ V > 0 the choice f￿￿g could not minimize V . Hence, the minimized
value of V is 0 and the equation system has a solution.
Denote the solution to the (8) by f￿ ￿1;:::;￿ ￿Hg: If there exists h such that
'h (￿ ￿h) > 0 then the strict monotonicity implies that the solution is unique.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof shows that the private provision equilibrium can be supported as
an announcement equilibrium. This establishes that the announcement equilib-
rium exists.
Under Assumptions 1i and 1ii a unique equilibrium exists for the private




Mh ￿ gh;gh + Gh
￿
g < Mh8Gh;









fUh (Mh ￿ gh;gh + 0)g > 0 for all h:
Assume initially that gh > 0 8h at this equilibrium. The last part of the
argument will relax this assumption. The private provision equilibrium is then
equivalent to a Lindahl equilibrium with cost shares ￿h =
gh PH
i=1 gh > 0; h =
1;:::;H, and public good level G =
PH
i=1 gh:
22Assume all participants other than h have made linear announcements, 'i =
ai ￿ bi￿i; with bi > 0. Such announcements satisfy Assumption 2 in the region
in which ai￿bi￿i > 0: Now consider participant h. The locus of values of f￿￿hg




) is de…ned by
ai ￿ bi￿i = aj ￿ bj￿j; i = 1 if h 6= 1; i = 2 if h = 1; j = 1;:::;H:







￿k+1; k = 1;:::;H ￿ 1; k 6= h:
Recursively substituting for h = 1;:::;H ￿1; using the fact that the shares must
sum to 1, solving for ￿H; then substituting into the announcement of H shows





















The same construction holds for all h = 1;:::;H.
A necessary condition for the private provision equilibrium to be supported
by the announcements is that the gradient of the choice locus is equal to the
gradient of the indi¤erence curve of participant h at the point f￿h;Gg: The
gradient of an indi¤erence curve of h is
dG
d￿h







Since gh > 0 at the private provision equilibrium it follows that Uh
x = Uh
G and
￿h < 1: Therefore rh = G
1￿￿h > 0: Since this applies for all h it is necessary to






= rh; h = 1;:::;H:



















Hence there is a strictly positive solution.














23Given these values for bh the values of ah; h = 1;:::;H; can be chosen to ensure
that the announcements satisfy



















must be satis…ed when evaluated at the private provision equilibrium fghg.
Consider now a private provision equilibrium where the contribution is 0
for some participants. Partition the set of participants into the set H+ for
whom gh > 0 and the set H0 for whom gh = 0: Apply the argument given
above to support the choices of the participants in set H+. The intersection of
their announcements determines the locus of potential allocations facing each
participant in the set H0 given that all other in the set choose gh = 0: Since
non-contribution was privately optimal for set H0 in the private provision equi-
librium, it will remain so in the announcement equilibrium. Therefore assign
an announcement to each member of the set H0 that intersects the locus of
potential allocations at G < 0. This results in the cost shares being 0 for all
h 2 H0 which is an equilibrium outcome.
Finally, the private provision equilibrium satis…ed gh < Mh. Since the an-
nouncement equilibrium is constructed to satisfy ￿hG = gh it must be feasible.
Proof of Lemma 2





By Assumption 1iii there must exist some alternative announcement ~ 'h with



























= 0 cannot be an equilibrium for any '￿h: Hence, the
equilibrium must be unique with ^ 'h (^ ￿h) > 0 for at least one h: Denote the
set of h for which ^ 'h (^ ￿h) > 0 is positive at equilibrium by K. For h 2 K the
linear announcements ^ ah ￿ ^ bh￿h are constructed to have a unique intersection
at f^ ￿hg. By de…nition no participant h 2 K will deviate from the equilibrium
with announcements f^ 'h (￿h)g and the equality ^ bh = ^ '
0
h (^ ￿h) guarantees that
this is also true for the linear announcements. For h 2 H=K it follows that
^ ￿h = 0 so de…ne ^  h (￿h) = 0 for all ￿h: This ensures no deviation. These linear
announcements support the equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2
(i) The proof of Lemma 2 establishes that in equilibrium G > 0 for general
announcements 'h; the proof adapts immediately to linear announcements.
Hence, any equilibrium must have G > 0: In addition, Assumption 1iv im-
plies that G <
PH
h=1 Mh in equilibrium. The next step is to show that for b










H Mh) > 0 will have ￿h > 0 in
equilibrium. The …nal step is to show that such an equilibrium can be made
approximately e¢cient.
Fix a value of b and assume that the resulting equilibrium has H￿ ￿ 1 <
H participants with ￿h > 0 and public good level G￿. Partition the set of
participants so that if h 2 H+ then ￿h > 0 and if h 2 H0 then ￿h = 0: Take any
h0 such that h0 2 H0. It must be the case that h0 announced a demand with
ah < G￿. Now consider h0 announcing a
0
h > G￿ such that ￿h0 increases from 0
to ￿￿h0 ￿ 1. This increases the level of the public good by ￿G￿ = b￿￿h0, and

























H Mh) > 0 then there exists bh
0
su¢ciently
large that (25) holds for all b ￿ bh
0
. Hence, ￿h0 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium
outcome for b ￿ bh
0
: Furthermore, there exists some e b such that for b = e b









H Mh) > 0. Therefore,






x (Mh;G￿) > 0 must have






x (Mh;G￿) = 0 have ￿h = 0. Denote the
subset of the former by H+ and the subset of the latter by H0. Thus, ￿h 2 (0;1]
for all h 2 H+, and ￿h = 0 for all h 2 H0.
In equilibrium with b = e b every agent h 2 H+ can be represented as choosing
























































































Because incomes are bounded and by the individual feasibility assumption G








arbitrarily close to one: the equilibrium is approximately e¢cient. Furthermore,
















so as b gets larger the shares get closer to 1







x (Mh;G￿) > 0.
(ii) Fix a value of a and apply the process used in (i) above to partition
the set of participants into two subsets H+ and H0: If h0 2 H0 announces a
demand that changes the share ￿h0 from 0 to ￿￿h0 ￿ 1, the level of public good
increases by ￿G￿ = bh0￿￿h0, and xh0 is reduced by ￿xh0 = ￿￿h0 (G￿ + ￿G￿).











￿￿h0 (a ￿ G￿)
=
G￿
a ￿ G￿: (26)
The same argument used in (i) establishes that there exists a large enough so






x (Mh0;G￿) = 0 and ￿h0 = 0. Furthermore, there exists some e a such that for









H Mh) > 0. Therefore, in






x (Mh;G￿) > 0 must have






x (Mh;G￿) = 0 have ￿h = 0. Thus, ￿h 2 (0;1]
for all h 2 H+, and ￿h = 0 for all h 2 H0.
In equilibrium with a = e a every agent h 2 H+ can be represented as choosing
































e a ￿ G
:


























e a ￿ G
:
so that for a large enough the equilibrium is approximately e¢cient.
Proof of Lemma 4





x = 1; i = 1;:::;H:
Using the necessary condition (12) with the change of variable ￿ = 1 ￿ z this




i(z) = 1: Solving the implied di¤erential
equation, 'i (z) = Ci
z :
The constants of integration, Ci, become the choice variables for the par-
ticipants. To see this note that at equilibrium we have Ci
￿i =
Cj
￿j ; all i;j; so
￿i = Ci PH
h=1 Ch and G =
PH







; which is precisely the objective function when
Ci is the level of contribution at the private provision equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5
The demand announcement of h is given by '(￿h) = Ch





. In equilibrium '(￿h) = G for all h, and
PH















The choice of participant h is de…ned by Ch ￿ argmaxUh (Mh ￿ ￿hG;G); so
it satis…es the necessary condition ￿Uh
x [1 ￿ (H ￿ 1)￿] + Uh
G = 0:
We need to show that for any ￿; 0 ￿ ￿ < 1
H; a Pareto improvement can be





















. The expression for C0
h is obtained by total di¤erentia-

























where for convenience we use the notation ￿h = ￿[1 ￿ (H ￿ 1)￿]Uh
xx + Uh
Gx;










































imply ￿h > 0 and ￿h < 0 for all h.






































which holds as long as ￿ < 1
H:
Proof of Lemma 6
Observe that the expression for
@Uh
@￿






















(H ￿ 1)(1 ￿ H￿):
The right-hand side is positive as long ￿ < 1








must be positive for at least one participant.
Proof of Theorem 3
28From the proof of Lemma 4 we know that the choice of announcement
must satisfy the necessary condition ￿Uh
x [1 ￿ (H ￿ 1)￿] + Uh
G = 0; for all
h = 1;:::;H. In the limit, as ￿ !
1
H









; which characterizes the point in the Samuelson set with equal shares.
Proof of Proposition 1
In the mechanism with …xed gradient sh = ah = argmaxUh (Mh ￿ ￿hG;G)






































[G0 (sh ￿ 2G) + G] = ￿
1
bH







































For this to be non-negative for all h;j the necessary and su¢cient condition is
￿(2G ￿ sh)[sh + (H ￿ 2)G]Uh
xx
￿ bH (2sh + (H ￿ 4)G)Uh




Proof of Proposition 2
29In the linear announcement mechanism with …xed intercept a the strategy
of consumer h is sh =
1
bh
= argmaxUh (Mh ￿ ￿hG;G), and in equilibrium








= sh (a ￿ G):
and




= ￿sh (a ￿ 2G)G0 ￿ G(a ￿ G);
@xh
@sj
= ￿sh (a ￿ 2G)G0;
@2xh
@sh@sj


















and the result follows. Note that






































are non-negative at least in a symmetric equilibrium (with H > 2). Hence,
if a ￿ 2G < 0 the terms with Uh
xx and with Uh




is non-negative for all h;for some set of values of a.
30References
Anderlini, L. and Siconol…, P. (2004) “E¢cient provision of public goods
with endogenous redistribution”, Review of Economic Design, 8, 413 - 447.
Aumann, R. (1959) “Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games”
in A.W. Tucker and R.D.Luce, eds., Contributions to the Theory of Games IV.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bergstrom, T.C. (1970) “A “Scandinavian consensus” solution for e¢cient
income distribution among nonmalevolent consumers”, Journal of Economic
Theory, 2, 383 -398.
Bergstrom, T.C., Blume, L. and Varian, H.R. (1986) “On the private provi-
sion of public goods”, Journal of Public Economics, 29, 25 - 49.
Bergstrom, T.C., Blume, L. and Varian, H.R. (1992) “Uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium in private provision of public goods”, Journal of Public Economics,
49, 391 - 392.
Bernheim, B.D., Peleg, B., and Whinston, M.D. (1987) “Coalition-proof
Nash equilibria I: Concepts”, Journal of Economic Theory, 42, 1 - 12.
Chen, Y. (2002) “A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing
Lindahl allocations”, Economic Theory, 19, 773–790.
Chen, Y. (2005) “Dynamic stability of Nash e¢cient public goods mecha-
nisms: Reconciling theory and experiment”, in: Amnon Rapoport and Rami
Zwick, eds., Experimental Business Research, Vol. II: Economic and Manager-
ial Perspectives, New York: Springer.
Cornes, R. and Hartley, R. (2004) “Well-behaved aggregative games” (un-
published).
Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1996) The theory of externalities, public goods
and club goods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (2000) “Pareto improving redistribution in the
pure public good model”, German Economic Review, 1, 169 - 186.
Groves, T. and Ledyard, J. (1977) “Optimal allocation of public goods: a
solution to the “free rider” problem”, Econometrica, 45, 783 - 809.
Groves, T. and Ledyard, J. (1980) “The existence of e¢cient and incentive
compatible equilibria with public goods”, Econometrica, 48, 1487 - 1506.
Groves, T. and Ledyard, J. (1987) “Incentive compatibility since 1972”, in:
T. Groves and R. Radner, eds., Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz, Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press.
Johansen, L. (1963) “Some notes on the Lindahl theory of determination of
public expenditures“, International Economic Review, 4, 346 358.
Lindahl, E. (1919) Positive Losung, die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, Lund,
reprinted as “Just Taxation - A Positive Solution“ in R.A. Musgrave and A.T.
Peacock (eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London: Macmillan.
Milgrom, P.and Roberts, J. (1990) “Rationalizability, learning and equilib-
rium in games with strategic complementarities,” Econometrica, 58(6), 1255–
1277.
Myles, G.D. (1995) Public Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
31Otani, Y. and Sicilian, J. (1982) “Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian pref-
erence games”, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 47 - 68.
Sertel, M.R. and Sanver, M.R. (1999) “Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-
endowment pretension games”, European Journal of Political Economy, 15, 149
- 162.
Tian, G. (1990) “Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the
Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension”, Journal
of Economic Theory, 51, 443 – 452.
Tian, G. (1991) “Implementation of Lindahl allocations with nontotal–nontransitive
preferences”, Journal of Public Economics, 46, 247 – 259.
Tian, G. (2003) “A solution to the problem of consumption externalities”,
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 39, 831 – 847.
Varian, H.R. (1994) “A solution to the problem of externalities when agents
are well-informed”, American Economic Review, 84, 1278 – 1293.
Walker, M. (1981) “A simple incentive compatible schemen for attaining
Lindahl allocations,” Econometrica, 49(1), 65 – 71.
32